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LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION: BALANCING CRIME
FIGHTING NEEDS AND PRIVACY RIGHTS
By Nancy K. Oliver*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Rapid technological developments over the last twenty-five years
have made cellular telephone location information ubiquitous and
increasingly more detailed. 1 As a result, these developments have
outpaced federal legislative solutions needed to address privacy
concerns, on the one hand, and clarify standards for law enforcement
access to such information, on the other. 2 At the same time, federal
courts from coast to coast have sought to apply appropriate legal
standards governed by these existing outdated statutory schemes and
Fourth Amendment rights in determining law enforcement's access to
information critical for criminal investigations and the fight against
violent crime. 3 To further complicate the issues, as the technology
has developed, the location information at issue before the courts has
ranged from marginally accurate geographic historical data, to that
which is real time and highly accurate, to within feet of the specific
device's location. 4 Moreover, the accuracy of the information varies
with the service provider and the cellular device. 5 The resulting
jurisprudence is, by necessity, a hodgepodge.

...

I.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, 1997-2008,
Division Counsel, United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives, Baltimore Field Division, 2008-Spring 2013. Washington
College of Law, The American University, J.D., University of Houston, B.A. Any
opinions or points of view expressed in this article represent those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the United States
Department of Justice. I would like to thank the hardworking agents at ATF and my
other talented and dedicated DOJ colleagues for reminding me why I became an
attorney, and I would especially like to thank Robert S. Carpenter for encouraging me
to become one.
ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of
the H. Comm. on the JudiCiary, III th Congo 18-19 (20 I 0) [hereinafter ECPA
Hearing] (statement of Matt Blaze, Assoc. Professor, University of Pennsylvania).
Id. at 65-66 (statement of Mark J. Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP).
Id.
Id. at 14 (statement of Blaze).
Id. at 29-30.
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Yet, just as technology evolves, so does the criminal element's
sophistication in utilizing it to evade detection by law enforcement.
For example, drug trafficking organizations have replaced a key
resource, the beepers and pagers of the past, with the cell phones of
today.6 And more recently, readily available prepaid cell phones add
the layer of anonymity to the criminal's essential tool for facilitating
his crimes. 7
Courts and Congress alike, along with scholars and privacy groups,
have realized the need for legislative solutions to diverse issues raised
by this advancing technology.8 Although some courts and scholars
have concluded that real-time location data should only be accessible
on a showing of probable cause, that conclusion has only led to the
need for a definition of "probable cause" in the context of obtaining
location information. 9 However, the call for a probable cause
standard for obtaining accurate, real-time location information
requires further debate in the context of law enforcement
investigative realities rather than merely assumed as a reactionary,
prophylactic measure driven by Orwellian fears.

6.

7.

8.

9.

See Joshua A. Engel, Doctrinal Collapse: Smart Phones Cause Courts to Reconsider
Fourth Amendment Searches of Electronic Devices, 41 U. MEM. L. REv. 233, 254
(2010).
See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2012) (describing drug
trafficking organization's use of prepaid phones); Lewis Medlock, Prepaid Cell
Phones: The New Growth Industry, EZINE ARTICLES, http://ezinearticles.coml
?Prepaid-Cell-Phones:-The-New-Growth-Industry&id=6192322 (last visited May 31,
2013) (describing growth in prepaid cell phones); Edward Lane, Texas Senator
Cornyn Proposes Law to Register Prepaid Cell Phones to Fight Criminals, THE
EXAMINER (June 7, 20 I 0), http://www.examiner.comlarticle/texas-senator-comynproposes-Iaw-to-register-prepaid-cell-phones-to-fight-criminals (discussing Senator
Comyn's efforts to require registration of prepaid cell phones).
See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of probable
cause and the potential issues of "retroactive unconstitutionality" raised by the
"mosaic" theory); see, e.g., In re United States for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of
Location Information for a Specified Wireless Telephone, 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 55356 [hereinafter Gauvey Order] (discussing the explosion of articles on cell site
tracking by law enforcement, congressional hearings, and legislative proposals). Due
to the long and cumbersome nature of the titles of cases dealing with applications for
CSLI as well as the fact that they are all titled virtually the same, the author will take a
cue from Magistrate Judge Austin from the Western District of Texas and use the
following shorthand form to refer to the decisions in those cases: "[Judge] Order"
followed by the citation to the reporting service.
See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
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A SHORT PRIMER ON CELL PHONE LOCATION
INFORMATION

As any "smart" phone owner lO is well aware, location infonnation
is integral to many, if not most, cell phones and the various
applications users install on them to enhance their day-to-day lives.
Facebook and Foursquare "friends" can let each other know their
exact location at any given moment, while other applications infonn
users of dining, shopping, and entertainment opportunities nearby.ll
Before the explosion of cell phones and call forwarding technology
an individual's phone number, by definition, told a caller the person's
location when the call was answered. Today, a call may rouse our
friend or colleague on the other side of the globe.
Unlike conventional land or wire-line telephones, cellular phones
use radio waves to communicate with the cellular service providers'
network of radio base stations. 12 The radio base station or tower
communicates with the cell phone whenever a call is placed or
received, as well as periodically when the cell phone automatically
signals or identifies itself to the base station. 13
With regard to cell phone location infonnation, two different
technologies are relevant. First, the cell phone handset may contain
global positioning system (GPS) hardware that detennines the cell
phone's location-latitude and longitude-based on the phone's
communication with satellites. 14 GPS location infonnation calculated
by the phone's handset, however, mayor may not be sent to the
cellular network or another third party, and is only reliable when the
handset is outdoors and can "see" the GPS satellites. 15 Furthennore,
the cellular service provider does not require GPS information to
provide the cell phone service. 16
The second type of technology, "network-based" location
technology, does not depend on satellites or GPS technology and is

10.

II.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

As of February 2012, 50% of American adults own a smart phone. Smartphones
Account for Half of all Mobile Phones, Dominate New Phone Purchases in the US,
NIELSEN WIRE (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.nielsen.com/us/eninewswire/2012/
smartphones-account-for-half-of-all-mobile-phones-dominate-new-phone-purchasesin-the-us.html.
Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of
Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REv. 681, 708 (2011).
ECPA Hearing, supra note I, at 20 (statement of Blaze).
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.at22.
Id. at 14.
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based on infonnation collected and analyzed by the cell phone
providers' base stations. 17 As noted above, the user's cell handset
uses radio waves to communicate with the base stations whenever
making or receiving a call, as well as when it registers or identifies
itself to the base station as it moves geographically throughout the
system. Technically, the radio base stations, also known as "cell
sites," are generally located on a cell "tower.,,18 However, base
stations are no longer limited to the tall three-sided radio towers
commonly seen along the roadways; they may be mounted indoors as
well and may be as small as a conventional stereo speaker. 19
In order to route incoming or outgoing calls, the cellular network
must keep track of the sector in which the phone is located. 20 The
accuracy of the location infonnation varies based on a number of
factors, but generally becomes more accurate with the increasing
geographic density of the towers and their cell sites and the
corresponding decrease in the actual geographic area serviced by any
particular cell site, i.e., the decreasing size of the cell sector. 21
According to the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association,
the number of cell sites has more than doubled between June 2002
and June 2012.22
In addition to decreasing cell site size, other technology available
to cellular providers can pinpoint a phone's latitude and longitude
within fifty meters or less by correlating the time and angle of arrival
of the handset's signal as it moves to the different cell sites,
regardless of whether calls are made or received as long as the phone
is turned on. 23 Although the capabilities and retention practices of
carriers vary, as noted by Professor Blaze in his testimony during
Electronic Communications Privacy Act refonn hearings, detailed
location data provides valuable information to the carriers, and the
trend of cellular providers to collect and maintain detailed location

17.
18.

19.
20.
21.

22.
23.

Id. at23.
Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now? Toward

Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress
Should Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 126 (2012).
In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (S. D. Tex.
2010).
ECPA Hearing, supra note I, at 14 (testimony of Blaze).
Id. at 23-24.
50 Wireless Quick Facts, CELLULAR TELECOMM. INDUST. ASS'N, http://www.ctia.org/
advocacy/researchlindex.cfrnlaidll0323 (last visited May 31, 2013).
ECPA Hearing, supra note I, at 26 (statement of Blaze).
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records can be expected to continue as the technology needed to do
so continues to develop. 24
Location information can be generally categorized into 3 basic
types: (1) information routinely collected by the cellular provider;25
(2) information collected by the cellular provider upon request by law
enforcement;26 and (3) information that law enforcement collects
independently of the cellular provider.27 At a minimum, cellular
service providers record and retain cell site location information
(CSLI) in the regular course of their business when a call is placed or
received. 28 The information is available on a historical as well as
prospective or real-time basis. However, the terms "historical" and
"prospective" can be ambiguous. 29
Historical CSLI refers to
information recorded and stored by the service provider prior to the
issuance of a court order.30 The terms "prospective" and "real-time"
are not synonymous, although they are frequently used
interchangeably. 31 Real-time CSLI is that which the government uses
to identify the location of the device at the moment it is transmitted
and is a subset of prospective information, which is created anytime
after the date of the court order. 32
In addition to obtaining the CSLI for a particular cell number, a
cellular provider can also provide all the cellular numbers and
subscriber information recorded by a particular cell site or tower
during a given time frame. 33

24.

25.

26.
27.
28.

29.
30.

31.

32.
33.

Id. at 27-28.
Location data is useful in identifying network deficiencies,
redundancies, and customer usage, as well as marketing and developing new services;
"service providers record everything essentially forever." Id. at 16.
Id. at 57 (testimony of Richard Littlehale, Assistant Special Agent, Tenn. Bureau of
Investigation).
See id.
See id. at 57-58.
United States v. Jones, No. 05-0386, 2012 WL 6443136, at *2 (D. D.C. Dec. 14,
2012).
ECPA Hearing, supra note I, at 86 (testimony of Stephen Smith, United States
Magistrate Judge).
In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use ofa Pen Register
and a Caller Identification Sys. On Tel. Numbers, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md.
2005).
ECPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 86 (testimony of Smith) (citing In re United States for
an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller
Identification Sys. On Tel. Numbers. 402 F. Supp 2d 597,599 & n.5 (D. Md. 2005).
Id.
See, e.g., In re The United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), Nos.
C-12-670M, C-12-671M, C-12-672M, C-12-673M, 2012 WL 4717778, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 26,2012) [hereinafter Owsley Order].
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The collection of more accurate location data based on the arrival
of the handset's radio signals is available prospectively during a 911
call34 and may be available to law enforcement when the carrier is
asked to collect it. 35 Nevertheless, there is a growing trend for
cellular providers to collect and maintain more accurate location
information for their own purposes. Further, and most intrusively,
law enforcement can use investigative tools that force a cell phone to
send a registration signal to the investigative device and thereby
identify the cell sector in which the phone is 10cated. 36
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that technology providing
precise cell phone location information has changed dramatically and
is likely to continue to do so. In addition, the accuracy and
availability of location data will vary geographically and across
service providers.
III.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME

The Stored Communications Act (SCA) was enacted in 1986 as
Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. 37 Although
the SCA does not explicitly refer to historical CSLI,38 historical CSLI
is a "record or other information pertaining to a subscriber. . . or
customer of [a provider of electronic communication service],,,39 and
is subject to disclosure under 18 U.S.c. § 2703(c) and (d). As such,
CSLI does not contain the content of any communication. 40 As
originally enacted, the SCA provided for court ordered disclosure
"only if the governmental entity show[ ed] that there [was] reason to
believe ... the records or other information sought[] [were] relevant
to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.,,41
In 1994, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA) and amended the SCA to the current
34.
35.
36.

37.

38.
39.
40.
41.

Pell & Soghoian, supra note 18, at 128-29.
Id. at 128.
The law enforcement technique utilizes "triggerfish" technology. See William
Curtiss, Triggering a Closer Review: Direct Acquisition of Cell Site Location
Tracking Information and the Argumentfor Consistency Across Statutory Regimes, 45
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 139, 165-67 (2013).
In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Comrn'n Servo to
Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 306 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Sloviter
Order] (citing Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat.
1848,1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (2006))).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11.
Sloviter Order, 620 F.3d at 307-08.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(I).
Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 207, 108 Stat. 1848, 1862 (1986)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)) (emphasis added).
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intermediate standard. 42 The SCA now provides that a court may
order disclosure of CSLI by the service provider if the government
"offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the ... information sought [is]
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.,,43 The
SCA also provides other mechanisms for disclosure of records and
information pertaining to the subscriber, including pursuant to a
warrant or the subscriber's consent. 44
In addition to amending the SCA, CALEA amended § 3121 of Title
18 of the United States Code-the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace
Devices Statute-and explicitly prohibited acquiring a subscriber's
CSLI "solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and
trace devices.'>45 The Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices
Statute authorizes the government to seek a court order for the
installation of a pen register or a trap and trace device based on a
certification that the "information likely to be obtained is relevant to
an ongoing criminal investigation.'>46 The terms "pen register" and
"trap and trace device" are defined by the statute and include
"dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information.,,47
In
general terms, a pen register device records the numbers dialedoutgoing calls-and a trap and trace device records caller
identifications-the numbers assigned to incoming calls. 48
As noted above, historical CSLI can be disclosed under the SeA as
a record or other information pertaining to the service provider's
42.

43.
44.
45.

46.
47.
48.

See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, §
207, 108 Stat. 4279, 4292 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 u.s.c. § 2703(d)); see
also Sloviter Order, supra note 37, at 314 (noting that CALEA established
intermediate standard).
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A)-(E).
Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006);
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act § 103, 47 U.S.c. § 1002
(2006). The broader language provides that "with regard to information acquired
solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined
in section 3127 of title 18, United States Code), such call-identifying information shall
not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber
(except to the extent that the location may be determined from the telephone
number)." ld.
18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2).
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3), (4).
H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING
COMPUTERS AND OBTAfNfNG ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE fN CRIMINAL INVESTIGA nONS 153,
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminaVcybercrime/docs/ssmanuaI2009.pdf (last
visited May 31, 2013).
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subscriber or customer. 49 In order to obtain real-time infonnation or
infonnation captured prospectively (after the date of a court order),
however, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) developed a "hybrid
theory" drawing on the combined authority of the Pen Registers and
Trap and Trace Devices Statute and orders issued under § 2703(d) of
Title 18. 50 Because CSLI also meets the definition of "dialing,
routing, addressing, or signaling infonnation,,,51 the Pen Registers
and Trap and Trace Devices Statute applies, but as noted above, it
cannot be the sole authority for location infonnation. 52 By combining
the two statutes, the government could obtain a court order for
prospective and real-time CSLI by applying both standards. 53
Pursuant to the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Statute, the
government certifies that the infonnation likely to be obtained is
relevant to the investigation, and pursuant to § 2703(d), the
government offers "specific and articulable facts showing that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the ... infonnation sought [is]
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.,,54 As
discussed in more detail below, the hybrid theory met with mixed
results among federal magistrate and district courtjudges. 55
In addition to the statutory authorities discussed above, CSLI may
also be disclosed pursuant to a Rule 41 probable cause warrant or a
wiretap order under Title III. 56 The relevant standards that the
government must meet to acquire CSLI, therefore, range from: (1)
demonstrating specific and articulable facts showing reasonable
grounds that the infonnation is relevant and material to the
investigation (SCA);57 (2) number one, plus a mere certificationrather than demonstration-that the infonnation is likely to be
relevant (SCA plus the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices
Statute);58 (3) demonstrating probable cause to believe that the
infonnation will reveal "evidence of a crime," "contraband, fruits of
[a] crime," or "property designed for use, intended for use, or used in
committing a crime" (Rule 41 );59 or (4) number three plus other
requirements such as demonstrating that other less intrusive
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See supra text accompanying notes 37-4l.
supra note 48, at 160.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 45.
See JARRETT ET AL., supra note 48, at 160.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 65-70.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 41(d)(I); 18 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006).
18 U.S.c. § 2703(d) (2006).
18 U.S.c. § 3123(a)(I) (2006).
FED. R. CRlM. P. 41 (c)(l)-{3).
JARRETT ET AL.,
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investigative techniques have been tried and have failed, or why such
methods reasonably appear unlike to succeed if tried, or would be too
dangerous (Title III "super warrant,,).60
Although not directly relevant to obtaining CSLI, it is interesting to
note that the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Statute
allows the government to capture call information from within the
private space of the home, which historically has revealed the
location of the caller or the one receiving the call on a much lower
standard-that is, the mere certification that the information is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. 61
IV.

JUDICIAL HODGEPODGE

The majority of the jurisprudence addressing the government's
access to CSLI is provided by the hardworking United States
Magistrate Judges across the country whose duties include issuing
search warrants and other orders related to criminal investigations. 62
As of the end of 2012, only one reported circuit court case has dealt
explicitly with the appropriateness of the SCA's intermediate
standard for obtaining CSLI. 63 The breadth of conflict found in the
existing case law highlights the need for congressional clarification. 64
In early 2008, Magistrate Judge Lenihan summarized the then state
of the case law on CSLI in a decision discussing both prospective and
historical CSLI on behalf of all the magistrate judges in the Western
District of Pennsylvania. 65 As Judge Lenihan pointed out, a
60.

61.
62.

63.
64.

65.

18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (2006). "The federal wiretap statute, originally passed in 1968
and sometimes called 'Title III' or the Wiretap Act, requires the police to get a
wiretap order-often called a 'super-warrant' because it is even harder to get than a
regular search warrant-before they monitor or record your communications."
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Wiretapping Law Protections, SURVEILLANCE
SELF-DEF., https:llssd.eff.orglwire/govtlwiretapping-protections (last visited May 31,
2013).
See infra text accompanying note 98.
As noted in Magistrate Judge Smith's testimony, there are over 500 magistrate judges
in the federal district courts whose duties include hearing civil matters and almost all
criminal matters except conducting felony trials. ECPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 79
(statement of United States Mag. J. Smith).
See Sloviter Order, supra note 37, at 314.
Because this issue has generated voluminous case law, the author does not attempt to
provide an analysis including all available cases, but rather has endeavored to focus
on cases that will enhance further discussion about (at least some of) the critical
issues. See cases cited infra note 67.
See In re The United States for an Order Directing a Provider ofElec. Commc'n Servo
to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 543 F. Supp. 2d 585, 599--600 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
[hereinafter Lenihan Order]. As discussed more fully below, the Court of Appeals for
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"significant majority" of the courts had denied the government access
to prospective and real-time location information based on the hybrid
theory, which, as noted above, combines the authority under the Pen
Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Statute and the SCA. 66 Even
magistrate judges within the same district disagreed over the
applicable standard for obtaining prospective CSLI. 67 With regard to
historical CSLI, decisions granting the government access had, for
the most part, concluded without analysis or merely suggested that
the government could obtain CSLI under the SCA. 68 Judge Lenihan
distinguished the reported opinions of two district court judges that
had specifically addressed and allowed the government to obtain
historical CSLI under the SCA.69 Judge Lenihan held, in part, that
because the cell phone was a "tracking device" under 18 U.S.C. §
3117, the communications from which are expressly excluded from
the SCA, the government could only obtain the CSLI, whether

66.
67.

68.
69.

the Third Circuit vacated Judge Lenihan's order in Sloviter Order, supra note 37. In
discussing Judge Lenihan's opinion, the court began by noting that the fact that the
opinion was joined by the other district court magistrate judges was "unique in the
author's experience of more than three decades on this court and demonstrates the
impressive level of support Magistrate Judge Lenihan's opinion has among her
colleagues .... " Id. at 308.
See Lenihan Order, supra note 65, at 599; supra notes 4~I.
Compare In re The United States for an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications
Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d
435,488 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (accepting hybrid theory), with In re The United States for
an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 2006 WL
468300, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006) (rejecting hybrid theory and noting that
"prospective cell site location information has been the subject of at least ten prior
decisions by Magistrate Judges in this Circuit and around the country"). Ultimately,
the disagreement in the Southern District of New York was resolved in favor of the
hybrid theory by Judge Kaplan in In re The United States for an Order for Prospective
Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 463
(S.D.N.Y.2006). However, Judge McMahon expressly disagreed with Judge Kaplan
in In re The United States for an Order Authorizing Use of a Pen Register with, Caller
Identification Device Cell Site Location Auth. on a Cellular Tel., 2009 WL 159187, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2009), rmding that CSLI did not constitute a record and that it
was a tracking device.
See Lenihan Order, supra note 65, at 600; see also ECPA Hearing, supra note 1
(statement of United States Mag. J. Smith).
Lenihan Order, supra note 65, at 604-05 n.53 (citing In re The United States for
Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.
Mass. 2007) [hereinafter Stearns Order]; In re The United States for an Order: (1)
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, & (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D. Tex.
2007) [hereinafter Rosenthal Order]).

2013]

Balancing Crime Fighting Needs & Privacy

495

prospective or historical, with a warrant pursuant to a showing of
probable cause. 70
Prior to Judge Lenihan's opinion, Judge Steams from the District
of Massachusetts and Judge Rosenthal from the Southern District of
Texas had overturned magistrate judges' decisions refusing access to
CSLI without a probable cause warrant. 71
Both specifically
addressed the required standard and upheld the government's access
to CSLI based on the government's proffer of specific and articulable
facts demonstrating reasonable grounds that the information was
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation under the
SCA. 72 Judge Steams, in allowing the disclosure of historical CSLI,
first determined that the SCA applies to historical CSLI. 73 The judge
then went on to determine that a demonstration of probable cause
under the Fourth Amendment was not required because the
government sought only historical information about the subject's
location in the past. 74 Further, the court noted that even if the
government sought prospective information that allowed the
government to "track" the cell phone into a protected area such as the
home, "there is nothing presumptively illegal about the possession of
a cellular phone," and "[t]he most that the 'tracked' cell phone might
reveal is that its owner might presently be found in the home.,,75 The
court went on to conclude that "[t]here is nothing, however, about
that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what
could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from
physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful
that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment
implication whatsoever.,,76
Following Judge Steams' decision, Judge Rosenthal-noting the
division among magistrate judges and district court judges and the
need for additional guidance to the courts and prosecutors-issued an
opinion, which discussed access to both prospective and historical
CSLI. 77 Judge Rosenthal began by finding that the government had
met its statutory burdens under both the Pen Registers and Trap and
70.
71.
72.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id at 589, 594-95, 601-607.
Stearns Order, supra note 69, at 81-82; Rosenthal Order, supra note 69, at 412, 418.
See Stearns Order, supra note 69, at 81-82 (allowing disclosure of historical CSLI);
Rosenthal Order, supra note 69, at 418 (allowing disclosure of both historical and
prospective CSLI, based on limited information sought by the government).
Stearns Order, supra note 69, at 79-80.
Id. at 81.
Id
Id
Rosenthal Order, supra note 69, at 412-13.
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Trace Devices Statute as well as the SCA by certifying that the
information likely to be obtained was relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation and by providing specific and articulable facts showing
reasonable grounds that the information sought was relevant and
material to the investigation, respectively.78 The judge then went on
to address whether the government had to demonstrate the higher
standard of probable cause. 79
Judge Rosenthal acknowledged other courts' concerns that CSLI
might be used to tum the cell phone into a tracking device. 80 He
noted, however, that the cases granting applications for CSLI did so
on a limited basis to "minimiz[e] the concern that a cell phone could
be used as a kind of 'tracking device. ",81 Just as in prior cases from
the Southern District of New York and the Western District of
Louisiana, which were based on similar facts and resulted in the grant
of the government's request,82 in the case before Judge Rosenthal, the
government did not seek information from multiple towers (thus
allowing triangulation), GPS activation, or other information that
would allow continuous tracking when the cell phone was not placing
a call. 83 The court further required that the information could only be
provided to the government after the cellular service provider
recorded and stored the information. 84
In response to Magistrate Judge Lenihan's 2008 decision and
following an appeal in which the district court affirmed the decision
without analysis, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued the
first appellate decision to address whether a court can deny the
government's access to historical CSLI once the government has met
its burden under the SCA. 85 In sum, the court rejected Judge

78.
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 414-18.
Id. at414.
Jd. at 415.
Id. at 415-16 (quoting In re The United States for an Order (I) Authorizing the
Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, & (2) Authorizing
Release of Subscriber & Other Info., 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
[hereinafter Rosenthal I Order]).
Id. at416.
Id. at417-18.
Id. at 419.
Sloviter Order, supra note 37, at 305-06. Prior to the Third Circuit opinion, the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected suppression of cell site location information
obtained when an agent dialed the suspect's cell number after losing visual contact
with him. See United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004). However, the
case did not involve access to CSLI under the SCA, but rather challenges under Title
III, 18 U.S.c. § 3117, and the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 949. Most notably, the court
found that
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Lenihan's reasoning and her interpretation of the legislative history
and held that the government was not required to demonstrate
probable cause and could obtain historical CSLI based on the SCA's
intermediate standard. 86 In reaching its decision, the court noted that
even if historical CSLI allowed an inference of the present or future
location of a person, and thus resembled a tracking device, the
"privacy interests at issue [in Fourth Amendment precedents] are
confmed to the interior of the home" and such privacy issues were
not present in the record before the court. 87 The court, therefore,
rejected Judge Lenihan's conclusion "that CSLI by definition, should
be considered information from a tracking device that, for that
reason, requires probable cause for its production.,,88
Although the Third Circuit affirmed the government's access to
historical CSLI under the SCA,89 the court did not stop there. The
court rejected the government's argument that the court is required to
issue an order for CSLI if the government meets its burden of
providing specific and articulable facts showing reasonable grounds
to believe that the information sought is relevant and material to the
ongoing criminal investigation. 90 First, the court looked to the
language of 18 V.S.c. § 2703(d) that states "a 'court order for
disclosure. .. may be issued by any court... of competent
jurisdiction and shall issue only if the [above] intermediate standard
is met.,,91 The court found that this is a permissive standard that sets
a necessary but not automatically sufficient condition. 92 Further,
since § 2703(c)(1 )(A) provides the option for disclosure of the
information pursuant to a warrant, the court was "unwilling to
remove that option" and held that magistrate judges have the
discretion to reqUire a warrant showing probable cause. 93

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

[T]he distinction between the cell-site data and Gamer's location is
not legally significant under the particular facts of this case. Here,
the cell-site data is simply a proxy for Gamer's visually observable
location. But as previously noted, Gamer had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in his movements along public highways.
Id. at 951. Similarly, in United States v. Skinner, the Sixth Circuit rejected a Fourth
Amendment challenge to CSLI obtained through a court order. United States v.
Skinner, 690 F.3d. 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2012).
Sloviter Order, supra note 37, at 314-15.
Id. at312-13.
Id. at 313.
Id.at312-13.
Id.at315.
Id.
Id.
Id.at319.
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Nevertheless, the court directed that a warrant "is an option to be
used sparingly because Congress also included the option of a §
2703(d) order.,,94
In rejecting the government's claim that the warrant option only
referred to the prosecutor's discretion to issue one form of process,
the court noted:
The Government's position would preclude magistrate
judges from inquiring into the types of information that
would actually be disclosed by a cell provider in response to
the Government's request, or from making a judgment about
the possibility that such disclosure would implicate the
Fourth Amendment, as it could if it would disclose location
information about the interior of a home. 95
Although concurring in the result and most of the reasoning, Judge
Tashima wrote a concurring opinion that highlights some important
points. 96 Judge Tashima was concerned that the majority's opinion
provided "no standards for the approval or disapproval of an
application for an order under § 2703(d) ... [and] vest[ed] magistrate
judges with ... uncabined discretion to grant or deny" the issuance of
the order. 97 Further, Judge Tashima was of the view
that the magistrate may refuse to issue the § 2703(d) order
here only if she finds that the government failed to present
specific and articulable facts sufficient to meet the
standard ... or, alternatively, finds that the order would
violate the Fourth Amendment absent a showing of probable
cause because it allows police access to information which
reveals a cell phone user's location within the interior or
curtilage of his home. 98
Additionally, Judge Tashima noted that the magistrate should be
permitted to issue a conditional order requiring minimization of such
information. 99
A few months before the Third Circuit issued its opinion in the
Sloviter decision, Magistrate Judge Austin in the Western District of
Texas joined the growing list of magistrate judges to produce a
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
/d.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 317.
at 319-21 (Tashima, 1., concurring).
at 320.
at 320 n.lO.
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lengthy opinion highlighting some of the legal issues permeating
requests for orders under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).100 In addition to
providing a summary of the case law to date,101 Judge Austin found
that a cell phone is a "tracking device" under 18 U.S.c. § 3117(b)
and held that the government's requests for CSLI, whether
prospective or historical, would only be granted pursuant to a
warrant based on probable cause as required by Rule 41.102 Judge
Austin acknowledged that other courts had issued orders for CSLI
using the SCA' s intermediate standard by distinguishing between
CSLI from a single cell tower and CSLI from multiple towers
allowing for triangulation (and greater precision) or GPS data.103 The
judge concluded, however, that, due to advancing technology, these
distinctions were "academic."I04
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Austin highlighted an
important-but rarely discussed-legal question: What does
"probable cause" mean in the context of a warrant for CSLI? 105
Judge Austin noted that in many warrant applications for CSLI, the
typical statement of probable cause set forth in the affidavit provides:
(1) there is evidence that the user of the target phone is
dealing in narcotics; (2) there is evidence that the target
phone is used in the narcotics dealing; and (3) being able to
track the user's movements would assist in the investigation
(for example, by helping to identify associates, stash houses,
or sources of supply). 106
The judge further explained, "On its face, this may seem adequate
to support the issuance of a warrant for CSLI. On closer inspection,
however, this conclusion is not so clear.,,107 Judge Austin then
discussed the opinion of Magistrate Judge Facciola of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, in which the judge
declined to issue a warrant because the information sought was not
100. See In re The United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing Use of a Pen Register &
Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info.; (3)
Authorizing Disclosure of Location Based Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 572 (W.O.
Tex. 2010) [hereinafter Austin Order].
101. See Id. at 573-75.
102. Id. at 578-79,583-84 & n.21.
103. Id. at 574.
104. Id. at 580.
105. Id. at 581.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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"evidence of a crime" but rather evidence that would be relevant and
admissible in the criminal case. 108 Judge Austin then analyzed the
parts of Rule 41 dealing with search and seizure of persons or
property and warrants for tracking devices, as well as the case law on
tracking devices. 109
Noting that "there are difficult questions
presented by the probable cause determination on CSLI
applications," to which the answers are not obvious, the judge
fashioned a "cautious approach" pending "more guidance from
Congress and the courts on [the] issues."llo Ultimately, Judge Austin
held that a warrant for CSLI could be based on a showing of
"probable cause to believe that tracking the phone will lead to
evidence of a crime.,,111 Nevertheless, more is needed than evidence
simply demonstrating that "a person has a cell phone and is engaged
in criminal conduct.,,112
The meaning of "probable cause" was raised again in a case before
Magistrate Judge Gauvey in the District of Maryland. 113 In that case,
the government sought prospective precise location information
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41, the SCA, and the All
Writs Act (pertaining to the inherent authority of the court) in order
to execute an arrest warrant. I 14 The government advanced two
arguments for obtaining the information under the Fourth
Amendment: first, that it was entitled to the information pursuant to
the arrest warrant, and second, that it could seek a search warrant to
obtain evidence in furtherance of apprehending the defendant. 115
The court held that the arrest warrant alone did not authorize the
government to obtain the location information, and a search warrant
was not authorized since the government did not seek any
infonnation that was evidence of a crime. 116 Had the government
provided evidence that the defendant was a fugitive and was fleeing
to avoid prosecution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1073, in which case
the defendant's location would have been evidence of his crime of
flight, a search warrant would have authorized. 117 In addition,
although a search warrant could have been issued based on probable
108. Id. at 581-82; see also In re The United States for an Order Authorizing the Release

of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 (D.D.C. 2006).
109.
110.
III.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Austin Order, supra note 100, at 582-83.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
Id.
Gauvey Order, supra note 8, at 530.
Id.
Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 537.
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cause that the defendant was at a specific location,118 that was the
very issue the government wished to resolve.
In discussing a warrant for location information, the court noted a
"vehement" disagreement between the parties about the nature of the
requisite probable cause. 119 The government asserted that probable
cause that the evidence sought would aid in the apprehension of the
defendant was sufficient. 120 The Federal Public Defender's Office
took the position that the government must establish a reasonable
probability that the information sought constitutes proof of a crime,
that is, that there must be a nexus between the item seized and the
criminal behavior. 121 The court ultimately concurred with the
defense. 122
The court recognized the government's "laudable societal goal of
bringing a charged defendant to justice," but the court deemed it "an
exercise of police power neither clearly envisioned in the Fourth
Amendment nor approved by the courts, in an area of quickly
shifting, complex technology.,,123 In its discussion, the court noted
that Professor Orin Kerr, in hearings in 2010 before the House
Committee on the Judiciary on Electronic Communications Privacy
Act reform, had raised the exact issue of the meaning of probable
cause. 124 Professor Kerr had asked:
... [PJrobable cause of what? Is that probable cause to
believe the person tracked is guilty of a crime? Or is it
probable cause to believe the evidence of location
information obtained would itselfbe evidence of a crime?
The difference is important. In the case of a search
warrant, "probable cause" generally refers to probable
cause to believe that the information to be obtained is itself
evidence of a crime. But cell phone location information
will itself be evidence of crime only in specific kinds of
cases. For example, such information normally will not be
evidence of a crime if investigators want to obtain the
present location ofsomeone who committed a past crime.

118. Id. at 550.
119. Id. at 560.
120. Id.

121. Id. at 560-61.
122. Id.at561.
123. Id. at 564.
124. Id. at 560 (internal citations omitted).
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To see this, imagine the police have probable cause to arrest
a criminal for a crime committed last week. The police
want to locate the suspect in order to arrest him. In that
case, the police will not have probable cause to believe that
the location of the criminal's cell phone is itself evidence of
a crime. The suspect's location a week after the crime
occurred does not give the police any information indicating
that the suspect did or did not commit the crime. But if the
police have probable cause to arrest someone, and they
know his cell-phone number, I would think the law should
allow the government some way of locating the suspect
pursuant to an appropriate court order. A requirement that
location information be obtainable only based on probable
cause to believe that the location information is itself
evidence of a crime would not seem to allow that. 125
The court further noted that although Professor Kerr had identified
the issue, he did not offer any solution, nor did any lawmakers in
proposed legislation that followed. 126 With respect to the SCA, the
court joined other jurisdictions holding that where prospective, realtime location information is sought, the cell phone is a tracking
device and subject to the requirements of Rule 41 and the Fourth
Amendment. 127
The decision in United States v. Maynard, 128 and subsequent
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Jones,129 resulted in
courts revisiting the standards for access to historical CSLI.
Magistrate Judge Orenstein, in the Eastern District of New York, was
one of the first to question the appropriate standards for historical
CSLI in light of the Maynard case. 130 Judge Orenstein had previously
granted applications for historical CSLI under the intermediate SCA
standard while requiring the government to establish probable cause
in an application for prospective CSLL 131 The Maynard decision
disturbed the uniformity among the circuits-which did not require a
warrant for tracking outside of the home-when it held that GPS
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
13l.

Id. (quoting ECPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 39--40 (statement of Orin Kerr,
Professor, George Washington University Law School)).
Id. at 564.
Id. at 577.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 554, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010), ajJ'd in part sub. nom.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,949 (2012).
In re The United States for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-site Info.,
736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) [hereinafter Orenstein Order].
Id. at 580.
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tracking infonnation was obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment; thus, the judge was compelled to re-analyze the issue. 132
Judge Orenstein reaffinned his prior conclusion that "as a statutory
matter the SCA penn its a court to issue the order [for historical
CSLI] without a showing of probable cause," but found the Maynard
reasoning persuasive and the government's efforts to distinguish it
from the instant case unavailing. 133 Accordingly, the judge held that
the Fourth Amendment required a warrant based on probable
cause. 134
Next, Magistrate Judge Stephen William Smith in the Southern
District of Texas l35 followed Judge Orenstein's suggestion that
"courts re-examine the constitutionality of historical cell site requests
in light of recent appellate court decisions," including Maynard. 136 In
detennining consolidated requests for historical eSLI under the seA
in three criminal investigations, Judge Smith held that, although he
had previously granted such requests, the "earlier interpretation of the
SCA is now constitutionally irnpennissible.,,137 Judge Smith began
by documenting the vast developments in location technology in his
"Findings of Fact.,,138 Since prior decisions allowing historical CSLI
without a warrant relied on imprecise location data, Judge Smith
observed that "the continuing vitality of those decisions must be
doubted." 139
The judge ultimately concluded that eSLI was "squarely within the
protective ambit of United States v. Karo," because the eSLI would
reveal infonnation about constitutionally protected spaces. 140
Although finding that reliance on the Maynard case was not
"essential," Judge Smith proceeded to analyze the case and concurred
in Judge Orenstein's "holding that Maynard's prolonged surveillance
doctrine precludes the Government from obtaining two months of
cell phone tracking data without a warrant.,,141 Judge Smith, thus,
based his decision that warrantless disclosure of CSLI violates the

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 581-82.
Id. at 584-95.
Id. at 579.
See, e.g., In re The United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827,
829 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
Id. at 830, 840.
Id. at 829 & n.2.
Id.at831-35.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 836-38.
Id. at 838, 840.
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Fourth Amendment on two independent grounds: Karo and
Maynard. 142
As noted by my colleague in Post-Jones: How District Courts Are
Answering the Myriad Questions Raised by the Supreme Court's
Decision in United States v. Jones, the decision left many questions
unanswered. 143 The majority's decision, reverting to a trespass theory
on physical property, does little to elucidate the implications of using
CSLI in criminal investigations. Perhaps the best that might be
gleaned is that the Court may revisit the third-party doctrine, which
holds that a person loses her reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily revealed to third parties. 144
Since Jones, courts analyzing access to historical CSLI have been
reluctant to extend Fourth Amendment protections to such
information. The court in United States v. Graham rejected the
defendant's claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when the government obtained historical CSLI without a warrant
based on probable cause. 145 The court noted that prior decisions were
divided among: (1) those which found that the Fourth Amendment
was implicated and a showing of probable cause was required under
certain circumstances, particularly if the information covered a
sufficiently long period of time, thus implicating a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) decisions finding the
SCA's intermediate standard sufficient regardless of the time period
involved because the information constituted a business record held
by third parties and voluntarily conveyed by the person. 146 The court
highlighted two important distinctions between Maynard and the
instant case. 147 First, Maynard involved real-time monitoring of the
suspect's location as opposed to historical location information,148

142. ld. at 846. Judge Smith also rejected the government's argument that the Fourth
Amendment was not implicated because the records were voluntarily conveyed to the
provider. ld. at 840-45.
143. Jason D. Medinger, Post-Jones: How District Courts are Answering the Myriad of
Questions Raised by the Supreme Court's Decision in United States v. Jones, 42 U.
BALT. L. REV. 395 (2013).
144. Compare United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,951-52 (2012), and United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-84, (1983), with Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
145. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385, 387, 389, 396--97, 406 (D. Md.
2012).
146. ld. at 388-89 (emphasis added).
147. !d. at 391-92.
148. ld.
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and second, the SCA incorporates judicial review, which was not
present in Maynard. 149
In discussing the Jones case, the court concluded that although a
five justice majority appeared "willing to accept the principle that
government surveillance over time can implicate an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy... the factual differences
[between the technologies] lead this [c]ourt to proceed with caution
in extrapolating too far from the Supreme Court's varied opinions in
Jones."150 Because access to "historical [CSLI] did not involve a
physical trespass," the court then proceeded to "analyze the Fourth
Amendment implications of the [SCA] under the Katz test," as
directed by the Jones case. 151
After a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court and Fourth
Circuit precedents, as well as the mosaic theory, the court concluded
that the third-party doctrine applied to historical CSLI and that, as
business records kept in the ordinary course of business, no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the records existed and no Fourth
Amendment violation occurred. 152 In addition, the court analyzed
and rejected the approach of Judge Garufis in the Eastern District of
New York, who, in the wake of Maynard, found an exception to the
third-party doctrine and held that the government was required to
obtain a search warrant based on probable cause for historical
CSLL I53 Most notably, Judge Bennett, while acknowledging Judge
Alito's statement in Jones that "'the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectations of privacy, '" went on to state:
[T]he law as it now stands simply does not contemplate a
situation whereby traditional surveillance becomes a Fourth

Id. at 392.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 400, 403; see also United States v. Ruby, No. 12CR1073(WQH), 2013 WL
544888, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12,2013) (holding that the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in cell site information, which was voluntarily conveyed to a
third party business); United States v. Madison, No. 11-60285-CR, 2012 WL
3095357, at *8-9 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012) (holding that the defendant had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in cell phone data that he voluntarily turned over to a
third party).
153. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 401; see also In re The United States for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 126
(E.O.N.Y. 2011) (concluding that defendants have a sufficiently protected privacy
interest in CSLI to warrant an exception to the third party doctrine).

149.
150.
151.
152.
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Amendment "search" only after some specified period of
time-discrete acts of law enforcement are either
constitutional or they are not. ... The fact of the matter is
that in enacting the Stored Communications Act, Congress
passed a law that rejects a warrant requirement for this type
of information, but does require specific and articulable
facts to be determined by a judicial officer.
Further, it is entirely unclear what the implications would
be of an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that
protects "cumulative" data collected by law enforcement.
Taken to its logical extreme, such a reading would
theoretically affect entire police investigations, and not just
surveillance via cell site location data. In Jones, Justice
Alito stated that "relatively short-term monitoring of a
person's movements on public streets accords with
expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as
reasonable," but goes on to conclude that "the line was
surely crossed" when that monitoring continued for four
weeks. If that is how the Fourth Amendment is to be
interpreted, then the police could commit a constitutional
violation by taking enough individually permissible steps,
that in the aggregate, add up to a substantial amount of data
being collected on a suspect-thereby infringing his
reasonable expectation ofprivacy. For example, using only
ordinary investigatory techniques, police can (and do)
collect vast amounts of data on criminal suspects. After
interviewing witnesses, conducting surveillance (perhaps
enhanced by discrete requests for historical cell site location
records under the Stored Communications Act), and
reviewing pen registers and bank records, police may be
able to paint an "intimate picture" of a person's life. Under
the mosaic theory, at some point this collection of data
would become a Fourth Amendment search at some
undefined point. 154
More succinctly, as pointed out by Professor Kerr, "[T]he mosaic
theory has the bizarre consequence of creating retroactive
unconstitutionality.,,155
Finally, two other points made by the court are worth mentioning.
First, the court noted that "even if cell site records could definitively

154. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 401(first emphasis added) (citations omitted).
155. ld. at 402.
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indicate that an individual is in his home, that information only
reveals that a person made or received a phone call while at homein other words, non-incriminatory information that is clearly
obtainable via the ... pen register.,,156 Second, the court highlighted
the importance of legislative-not judicial-solutions to privacy
concerns stemming from rapidly developing technologies. 157
Since Jones, other courts have come to the same conclusion that
historical CSLI records are afforded no Fourth Amendment
Magistrate Judge Collings, in the District of
protection. 158
Massachusetts, recently revisited the issue in light of Jones. 159
Noting that probable cause had not been required for such records
since Judge Steams' decision in 2007, Judge Collings nevertheless
wrote to highlight the difficult question of what constitutes a
reasonable expectation of privacy in our electronic age and the
eventual and inevitable resolution by either the Supreme Court or
Congress. l60 Judge Collings concluded that the best approach was
counseled by Judge Bennett in Graham, who had relied on the
Supreme Court's caution that the judiciary should not prematurely
elaborate on Fourth Amendment implications in the wake of
emerging technology. 161 Thus, Judge Collings reiterated that Judge
Steams' opinion would be followed "[u]ntil either the First Circuit
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court rule [s] otherwise, or
Congress enacts legislation dealing with the problem.,,162
As noted previously, after the Maynard decision, Magistrate Judge
Smith l63 revisited the constitutionality of applications for historical
CSLI and concluded that warrantless disclosure of CSLI violates the
Fourth Amendment. The district court subsequently adopted Judge
156. Id. at 404.
157. Id. at 404-05 ("When technology is in flux, Fourth Amendment protections should
remain relatively modest until the technology stabilizes .... [T]he legislative branch
rather than the judiciary should create the primary investigative rules when technology
is changing.") (quoting Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 805--06
(2004)).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Ruby, No. 12CRI073(WQH), 2013 WL 544888, at *6 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 12,2013); United States v. Madison, No. 11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 3095357,
at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012).
159. In re The United States for an Order Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section
2703(D) to Disclose Subscriber Info. & Cell Site Info., 849 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass.
2012).
160. Id. at 178.
161. Id. at 179.
162. Id.
163. See supra text and accompanying notes 119-120.
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Smith's ruling that § 2703(d) orders for CSLI are unconstitutional
and the government appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 164 The Fifth Circuit
issued its opinion on July 30, 2013, while this article was pending
publication. 165
The Fifth Circuit began by disagreeing with the Third Circuit's
conclusion that the court has discretion to deny the government's
request for a court order based on the lesser SCA standard and
require a warrant based on probable cause. 166 As to the constitutional
question, the court found that CSLI constitutes business records of
voluntarily conveyed information and therefore is not protected by
the Fourth Amendment. 167
Finally, the court acknowledged that technological advances can
impact reasonable expectations of privacy but expressly declined to
create its own rule contrary to the legislative solution enacted in the
SCA. 168 The court instead decided the case on the narrow grounds
before it holding that "Section 2703(d) orders to obtain historical
[CSLI] for specified cell phones at the points at which the user places
and terminates a call are not categorically unconstitutional.,,169
V. FINDING THE BALANCE
"When criminals use modem technological devices to carry out
criminal acts and to reduce the possibility of detection, they can
hardly complain when the police take advantage of the inherent
characteristics of those very devices to catch them.,,17o It is hard to
argue with the fundamental principle in Judge Rogers' statement. In
United States v. Skinner, Judge Rogers held that there was simply no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the CSLI at issue in the case. 171
The district court had affirmed Magistrate Judge Guyton's opinion
and concurred in his analysis of the issues.172 The district court held,
"[A]ssuming that a search occurred when the government utilized
cell-site data to locate and track defendant's vehicle as it traveled

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

In re The United States for historical cell site data, 724 F.3d 600,605 (5th Cir. 2013).
In re The United States for historical cell site data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 604-05.
Id. at 606-09.
Id. at 609.
Id.
United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id.
United States v. Skinner, No. 3:06-CR-100, 2007 WL 1556596 at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May
24,2007).
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upon public highways, the defendant lacked standing to assert a
Fourth Amendment protected interest in the cell phone data .... ,,173
The case, involving an extensive marijuana drug trafficking
organization, is a model for the criminal use of cell phones. The
source of the marijuana bought pay-as-you-go cell phones with false
names and addresses, programmed them with the criminal cohorts'
contact information, and distributed them to the couriers and other
participants. 174 They routinely discarded them and obtained new ones
with different numbers in different names. 175 The source did not
know that the phones were equipped with GPS technology.176 The
ultimate demise of the organization occurred when one of the phones
was identified in a wiretap interception as used by a courier soon to
be en route with a load of marijuana. 177 Drug Enforcement
Administration agents obtained a court order under 18 U.S.C. §
2703(d) and tracked the phone as it traveled across the country with
drugs, ultimately intercepting it in Texas en route to Tennessee. 178
No one can question that extensively detailed-geographical and
temporal-real-time, or hist0l1cai location information in the hands
of law enforcement, or non-governmental entities for that matter,
raises legitimate privacy concerns. At the same time, the courts and
Congress alike have frequently recognized that law enforcement
investigative interests and needs in furtherance of protecting the
public should not be unduly hindered but rather carefully balanced
with the privacy interests of the public it serves. 179 There is also little
question that rapid technological developments over the last two
decades provide increasingly sophisticated tools that can further both
criminality and law enforcement efforts seeking to interdict that
criminality in the interest of public safety and the reduction of violent
cnme.
The federal magistrate judges revi~wing requests for orders for
CSLI have grappled with these issues in an ever changing landscape
of highly technical information and in the wake of Maynard's
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Skinner, 690 F.3d at 775.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 776.
Id.
See, e.g., Lenihan Order, supra note 65, at 587; ECPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 4-5;
s. REp. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
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recogmtlOn that real-time, highly accurate monitoring over an
extended time period potentially reveals sensitive details about a
person's life. The courts' efforts have been further exacerbated by
the very nature of CSLI data, which can lead to uncertainty and
confusion about the precision of the location information sought by
the government as an initial matter and the specific information
ultimately available for production by the cellular service provider. 180
The resulting jurisprudence, while frequently thorough and
thoughtful, is largely unsettled. Courts have become increasingly
wary, and rightfully so, about Fourth Amendment implications
arising from intensive real-time or historical monitoring over
extended periods of time. Yet the courts are cautious about straying
too far from the guidance in Jones in addressing Fourth Amendment
concerns arising from emerging technology. lSI
The role of the courts in granting law enforcement access to
potentially intrusive techniques will forever remain a fact-driven
analysis in which the courts must engage. The variable nature of
CSLI and its rapidly developing technology add additional elements
to the shifting fact-based analysis the courts will continue to be
saddled with in evaluating government requests for CSLI.
Nevertheless, the courts and law enforcement would significantly
benefit from legislative clarification of static issues, such as whether
a cell phone can ever be a tracking device within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 3117. Moreover, legislation could address whether
prospective and real-time CSLI are obtainable under a § 2703(d)
order, as well as the government's burden in acquiring such CSLI.
Whether prospective or historical CSLI is at issue, courts and
Congress should be cautious in requiring a warrant based on probable
cause without a thorough analysis of the issues and ramifications. In
oral argument before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in In Re: Application of the United States for Historical Cell
Site Data, the court asked the government why it could not simply

180. See supra text and accompanying notes 20-24 (discussing how the cell site density
impacts the precision of data); e.g., Owsley Order, supra note 33, at *1, 4 (criticizing
government for not understanding the technology in CSLI applications); In Re The
United States for Historical Cell Site Data, No. 11-20884, Oral Arguments (Oct. 2,
2012), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgumentRecordings.aspx
(judge questions what CSLI information is actually requested pursuant to § 2703(d)
application for order).
181. See supra notes 141-145 (discussing Graham and other post-Jones decisions).
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seek a warrant. 182 Counsel for the government noted that a warrant
would require probable cause that the search would reveal evidence
of a crime whereas the CSLI order would only require the
government to provide specific and articulable facts that the
information would be relevant and material to the investigation. 183
The government then offered the hypothetical example of a
kidnapping where the parents had suspicions or concerns about a
particular individual. 184 Assuming the parents could point to some
specific facts underpinning the concerns, the government could meet
the latter standard but not the former. 185 Another example discussed
by the government involved a case in which, although the CSLI was
only accurate to within a few blocks, the CSLI confirmed that the
suspect traveled to another town to steal cars for use in the crime. 186
Yet another frequent example arises during the early stages of an
investigation when law enforcement agents have viable leads about
an individual's illegal activity but have very little information with
which to identify the suspect, perhaps merely a nickname, cell phone
number, and general area of operation. CSLI could confirm the
suspect's identity and lead to other relevant evidence or exonerate the
suspect.
These examples involve historical, prospective, and real-time CSLI,
without which the investigations could be significantly hindered. In
the kidnapping example, the use of CSLI could make the difference
between the successful recovery of the victim unharmed and
otherwise. There are no doubt other examples in which the warrant
standard cannot be met and its application will unduly hinder law
enforcement.
Even if Congress or the courts conclude that the higher
warrant/probable cause standard should be imposed on the
government's requests for CSLI, access to CSLI will be available
only in limited circumstances absent a clarification of "probable
cause" in this context. As noted above, Magistrate Judge Austin
confronted this problem and ultimately held that the warrant for CSLI
182. In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, No. 11-20884, Oral Arguments (Oct.
2, 2012), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.goy/OraiArgumentRecordings.aspx
(recordings of oral arguments at approximately at 44 minutes).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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would be issued based on probable cause that the information would
lead to evidence of a crime. 187 Modification of the warrant/probable
cause standard in an era of rapid technological change could lead to a
watering down of the standard.
Many of the issues raised by law enforcement's use of precise CSLI
are not subject to a simple fix. Whether applying a warrant/probable
cause standard or the lesser § 2703(d) standard, judicial oversight is
required for the release of CSLI. This provides the requisite neutral
determination to protect Fourth Amendment rights. As noted above,
the Third Circuit held that a court may approve the request on the
lesser standard or ask the government to meet a probable cause
standard. 188 This may be the wisest approach and would allow further
development of the law in this complex area. Given the factintensive nature of either determination, federal magistrate judges
will always be engaged in this process. It is incumbent upon the
government to come to the court with the best information it can
obtain about the CSLI available from the service providers and to
limit its requests to time periods reasonable to accomplish its
investigative goals. Further, the government needs to assuage the
court's concerns by providing proactive minimization procedures to
acknowledge and address potential capturing of CSLI in protected
areas that are irrelevant to the investigation or of individuals that are
unrelated to the investigation. 189
By proactively applying
prophylactic measures and requesting reasonable temporal data, the
government and courts can work together-at least in the short
term-to strike the balance between reasonable government access to
critical investigative information and legitimate privacy concerns.

187. See supra text accompany note 106.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 85-94. In addition, a consolidated appeal of
several of Magistrate Smith's denials of applications for 2703(d) orders is pending
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Case No. 11-20884.
189. See Owsley Order, supra note 33, at *4 (criticizing the government for not articulating
a plan for the data captured related to innocent persons).

